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 Allow me to introduce myself, and then to introduce you to a book that most 
readers of this publication will enjoy reading.  I am a law teacher, lawyer and legal 
writer.  I have argued appeals in the Supreme Court, most United States courts of appeal 
and a few state appellate courts.  I have written about appellate law and practice.  I was 
also honored to work with Paul Carrington in the Spring of 2006 at Duke Law School, as 
he taught an appellate law seminar based on early drafts of this book.   
 Now, about this book.  In 1994, Maurice Rosenberg, Paul Carrington and Daniel 
Meador published the first edition of this casebook.  Maurice Rosenberg passed away in 
1995.  Paul Carrington decided not to participate in a second edition.  Daniel Meador 
joined up with Joan Steinman and Thomas Baker to produce this new work.  The book 
still carries many of the insights that Maurice Rosenberg and Paul Carrington imparted to 
the first edition, but this is a brand new book and those who read the first edition should 
not assume they ―know‖ what is in it.   
Daniel Meador has for decades been among the most astute students of the 
judicial process.  Thomas Baker taught for many years at Texas Tech University School 
of Law and is now at Florida International University College of Law.  Joan Steinman 
teaches at Chicago-Kent College of Law.  Among them, they share more than 100 years 
of teaching, writing and practicing in the areas of trial and appellate courts.   
 Why do I say that you will enjoy ―reading‖ this book?  Surely, some of you may 
say to yourselves that I mean you should ―adopt‖ the book for a course or ―consult‖ the 
book for ideas.  However, I mean what I say.  One of the inherent vices of computer legal 
research, key numbers, and all similar ways of getting access to information is that we 
tend to lose broader perspectives about the history, shape, and direction of legal doctrine.  
And yet, outcomes are often determined more by those larger concepts than by particular 
citations of particular authorities.  Several years ago, the Tarleton Law Library at the 
University of Texas School of Law divided some first year students into two groups.  One 
group was to find relevant material using only books and other paper resources.  One 
group was to use only Westlaw and LEXIS.  The book group found more relevant 
material.  After all, in order to do computer searches, the researcher must first develop 
questions to ask.  One can formulate more focused questions based on an appreciation of 
those larger concepts previously just mentioned.   
 Beyond legal research for a client’s sake, lawyers must confront problems of 
appellate court structure and staffing.  The federal courts of appeal are struggling with 
ever-larger caseloads, and some critics have said that, on the whole, they are not doing a 
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good job with the situation. Judge Richard Posner, in his 2004 Harvard Law Review 
Foreword, lamented some of the work habits of federal appellate judges.
1
  Judge Patrick 
Higginbotham has been heard to say that judges should not delegate to law clerks—or 
worse yet to staff attorneys—the bulk of opinion-writing chores.  Despite these 
criticisms, one can see indisputable evidence that appellate decision-making is becoming 
more routine.  Courts hear oral argument in a smaller percentage of cases and set short 
time limits.  Clerks and staff attorneys write opinion drafts.  In non-argued cases, the 
deciding panel of judges may not even confer in person about a case, but simply review a 
draft opinion passed from hand to hand.  The appellate workload evokes Chesterton’s 
statement about the English judges: ―They are not cruel, they just get used to things.‖2  
 All of these developments undermine a central premise of the appellate adversary 
system.  The system works best when advocates contend against each other in front of 
judges who are prepared to ask hard questions.  For lawyers who represent clients on 
appeal, their first task is to have their case noticed as worthy of serious judicial attention.  
This initial task arises at the threshold of litigation, as the lawyer confronts many rules 
about finality, timing, preservation of issues, and standard of review, any of which may 
be invoked to end the case without ever getting to the merits.  The work intensifies as the 
lawyer addresses the scope of appellate judicial power and the likely ways in which that 
power will be exercised.   
 In short, the best appellate lawyers will be those who have a broad view of where 
appellate courts fit in the overall system that calls itself justice.  They will appreciate the 
way in which good appellate judges work with case records and legal principles.  Armed 
with this basic understanding, lawyers can sometimes persuade even tired judges to 
engage in the process.   
 This book merits our attention because the authors have given us a picture of 
appellate decision-making that illuminates the process while guiding us on how to make 
it work.  The first chapter is an overview of appellate judging.  The second chapter gives 
us the most important cases on almost every aspect of appellate justiciability, from proper 
parties, to finality, to timing.  The case selection is admirable:  These are what one of my 
professors called ―lighthouse cases.‖  That is, if you study these cases, you can enter the 
case names into a computerized search engine and find how the caselaw has developed in 
that doctrinal area, because no court can decide an issue in such an area without citing 
these foundational cases.   
 The authors then take us through standards of review, using materials that help us 
to see the relationship among trial judges and their appellate colleagues.  This is a 
difficult area of procedural law.  Trial judges like to think they should be affirmed, either 
because their direct contact with witnesses and pleadings gives them a better vantage 
point; because the point on which the appellate court comes to rest really doesn’t matter 
in the scheme of things; or for expressed or unexpressed reasons that are more 
personalized and subjective.  Appellate judges have opinions about the abilities and 
temperament of trial judges and about which issues merit deference to the lower court.   
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 Over time, these different views have crystallized into a structure of review 
standards.  Consider, for example, the rule that admission or exclusion of evidence is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  The rule makes sense because those decisions usually 
involve the trial judge in hitting a moving target–shaping the case as it is being tried.  
Any given admission/exclusion decision is not likely to be truly significant in the case as 
a whole, and the abuse of discretion rule ties up with the harmless error rule to insulate 
judgments from reversal.  However, in order to benefit from the abuse of discretion 
standard, the trial judge must correctly apply the applicable rule.  Review of rule 
interpretation is de novo, because the appellate court is as prepared as the trial judge to 
decide a legal question, and perhaps more so, because the appellate judges can take more 
time to analyze the issue.   
 The authors give us a great deal of practical insight about the interplay among the 
different standards of review.  One good example is an essay by Judge Henry Friendly 
that also includes Chief Justice Marshall’s views on the point.  Inclusion of this essay 
illustrates a great strength of this book.  Charles Alan Wright used to say that if you want 
to know how to catch fish, you should ask fish and not fishermen.  If you want to impress 
judges, ask judges what they look for.  
 When judges decide cases, they justify a result.  Case law necessarily gives 
limited information on how to operate within the process.  Then, some judges are hardly 
self-reflective about what they do.  But judges such as Henry Friendly were anxious to 
make their process of deciding transparent.   
 The authors are also careful to place appellate judging in its separation of powers 
and federalism contexts.  In discussing judicial creation of causes of action, they give us 
an edited version of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
3
 in which the Supreme Court sets out 
standards for recognizing actionable torts committed in violation of the law of nations.  
The authors note that federal judges have limited power to create causes of action, given 
the strictures of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
4
  Under state constitutions, appellate 
judges may enjoy more latitude.  However, in both systems the process of judicial 
selection—itself regulated by separation of powers concerns—is of great impact on the 
course of decisional law, and the authors devote attention to it.   
 The authors also introduce us to the other issue on which Erie turns: Federalism.  
They devote some attention—and  I wish they had given more—to relationship between 
state and federal courts.  There are the ordinary instances of relationship, such as 
Supreme Court review of state judgments, state court decisions on questions certified 
from federal courts, and the influence of federal rules on state rulemaking.  However, the 
ongoing battle over federal habeas corpus might have profitably engaged the authors’ 
attention.  The federal courts ―review‖ of state court criminal judgments, and the battle 
over the timing, availability, and extent of review rages in legislative and judicial forums.  
The book has 1057 numbered pages, plus tables and indices.  This is, I think, 
problematic.  I would be hard put to eliminate any given item, but I can see that some 
ruthless editing would be possible.  A three-unit law school course is, at least where I 
teach, 42 class sessions of 50 minutes each.  There is so much material in this book that I 
don’t see that any group of teacher and students can get through it all in three units worth 
of class time.  Yet all of the topics are important to understanding the appellate process.   
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 In addition, I suggest that in the next edition, the authors take a fresh look at their 
―comparative perspective.‖  They ably introduce us to the United Kingdom and German 
appellate systems and then spend only five pages with brief references to the European 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.  I think a thorough reworking 
of this material would greatly shorten the treatment of UK and German procedure and 
add substantially to information about ad hoc and permanent transnational courts.  The 
European Courts are important as examples of tribunals created by and sitting over the 
courts of individual states.  However, recent events have shown us that transnational 
courts can exist as alternatives to national tribunals, particularly in the enforcement of 
human rights.  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights are important institutions in the Western Hemisphere. 
The international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) were 
created because victim redress was difficult in the national courts of those countries, and 
hence are ―appellate‖ in purpose if not strictly in function.  The International Criminal 
Court will also have a significant effect on the hierarchy of judging.  The ICTY, ICTR, 
and ICC have their own appellate structures, which represent an amalgam of common 
law and civil law procedures.   
 In a world where almost all of our students will be touched by transnational rules 
and institutions to a much greater extent than was our own generation, comparative 
perspectives are an essential ingredient of almost every law school subject.   
 To sum up, this book deserves a place on your shelf, and if you teach at a law 
school, a place in your curriculum.   
